The recent financial crisis has generated many distinct perspectives from various quarters. In this article, I review a diverse set of 21 books on the crisis, 11 written by academics, and 10 written by journalists and one former Treasury Secretary. No single narrative emerges from this broad and often contradictory collection of interpretations, but the sheer variety of conclusions is informative, and underscores the desperate need for the economics profession to establish a single set of facts from which more accurate inferences and narratives can be constructed.
Introduction
In Akira Kurosawa's classic 1950 film Rashomon, an alleged rape and a murder are described in contradictory ways by four individuals who participated in various aspects of the crime.
Despite the relatively clear set of facts presented by the different narrators-a woman's loss of honor and her husband's death-there is nothing clear about the interpretation of those facts. At the end of the film, we're left with several mutually inconsistent narratives, none of which completely satisfies our need for redemption and closure. Although the movie won many awards, including an Academy Award for Best Foreign Language Film in 1952, it was hardly a commercial success in the United States, with total U.S. earnings of $96,568 as of April 2010.
1 This is no surprise; who wants to sit through 88 minutes of vivid story-telling only to be left wondering whodunit and why?
Six decades later, Kurosawa's message of multiple truths couldn't be more relevant as we sift through the wreckage of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Even the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission-a prestigious bipartisan committee of 10 experts with subpoena power who deliberated for 18 months, interviewed over 700 witnesses, and held 19 days of public hearings-presented three different conclusions in its final report. Apparently, it's complicated.
To illustrate just how complicated it can get, consider the following "facts" that have become part of the folk wisdom of the crisis:
1. The devotion to the Efficient Markets Hypothesis led investors astray, causing them to ignore the possibility that securitized debt 2 was mispriced and that the real-estate bubble could burst.
prior to 2007, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), 3 the mortgage-related bonds at the center of the financial crisis, were offering much higher yields than straight corporate bonds with identical ratings, apparently for good reason. 4 Disciples of efficient markets were less likely to have been misled than those investors who flocked to these instruments because they thought they had identified an undervalued security.
As for the second point, in a recent study of the executive compensation contracts at 95 banks, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) conclude that CEOs' aggregate stock and option holdings were more than eight times the value of their annual compensation, and the amount of their personal wealth at risk prior to the financial crisis makes it improbable that a rational CEO knew in advance of an impending financial crash, or knowingly engaged in excessively risky behavior (excessive from the shareholders' perspective, that is). an extensive empirical study of major banks and broker-dealers before, during, and after the financial crisis, Murphy (2011) concludes that the Wall Street culture of low base salaries and outsized bonuses of cash, stock, and options actually reduces risk-taking incentives, not unlike a so-called "fulcrum fee" in which portfolio managers have to pay back a portion of 3 A CDO is a type of bond issued by legal entities that are essentially portfolios of other bonds such as mortgages, auto loans, student loans, or credit-card receivables. These underlying assets serve as collateral for the CDOs; in the event of default, the bondholders become owners of the collateral. Because CDOs have different classes of priority, known as "tranches", their risk/reward characteristics can be very different from one tranche to the next, even if the collateral assets are relatively homogeneous. 4 For example, in an April 2006 publication by the Financial Times, reporter Christine Senior (2006) filed a story on the enormous growth of the CDO market in Europe over the previous years, and quoted Nomura's estimate of $175 billion of CDOs issued in 2005. When asked to comment on this remarkable growth, Cian O'Carroll, European head of structured products at Fortis Investments replied, "You buy a AA-rated corporate bond you get paid Libor plus 20 basis points; you buy a AA-rated CDO and you get Libor plus 110 basis points".
5 These figures include unrestricted and restricted stock, and stock options valued according to the BlackScholes formula assuming maturity dates equal to 70% of the options' terms. I thank Kevin Murphy for sharing these data with me.
6 See Thomas (2008) .
their fees if they underperform.
And as for the leverage of investment banks prior to the crisis, Figure 1 shows much higher levels of leverage in 1998 than 2006 for Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and Lehman Brothers.
Moreover, it turns out that the SEC rule change had no effect on leverage restrictions (see Section 4 for more details).
Figure 1: Ratio of total assets to equity for four broker-dealer holding companies from 1998 to 2007. Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office Report GAO-09-739 (2009, Figure 6 ).
Like World War II, no single account of this vast and complicated calamity is sufficient to describe it. Even its starting date is unclear. Should we mark its beginning at the crest of the U.S. housing bubble in mid-2006, or with the liquidity crunch in the shadow banking system 7 in late 2007, or with the bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers and the "breaking 7 The term "shadow banking system" has developed several meanings ranging from the money market industry to the hedge fund industry to all parts of the financial sector that are not banks, which includes money market funds, investment banks, hedge funds, insurance companies, mortgage companies, and government sponsored enterprises. The essence of this term is to differentiate between parts of the financial system that are visible to regulators and under their direct control versus those that are outside of their vision and purview. See Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, and Boesky (2010) for an excellent overview of the shadow of the buck" 8 by the Reserve Primary Fund in September 2008? And we have yet to reach a consensus on who the principal protagonists of the crisis were, and what roles they really played in this drama.
Therefore, it may seem like sheer folly to choose a subset of books that economists might want to read to learn more about the crisis. After all, new books are still being published today about the Great Depression, and that was eight decades ago! But if Kurosawa were alive today and inclined to write an op-ed piece on the crisis, he might propose Rashomon as a practical guide to making sense of the past several years. Only by collecting a diverse and often mutually contradictory set of narratives can we eventually develop a more complete understanding of the crisis. While facts can be verified or refuted-and we should do so expeditiously and relentlessly-we must also recognize the possibility that more complex truths are often in the eyes of the beholder. This fact of human cognition doesn't necessarily imply that relativism is correct or desirable; not all truths are equally valid. But because the particular narrative that one adopts can color and influence the subsequent course of inquiry and debate, we should strive at the outset to entertain as many interpretations of the same set of objective facts as we can, and hope that a more nuanced and internally consistent understanding of the crisis emerges in the fullness of time.
To that end, I provide brief reviews of 21 books about the crisis in this essay, which I divide into two groups: those authored by academics, and those written by journalists and former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. The books in the first category are:
• Acharya, Richardson, van Nieuwerburgh, and White, 2011, Guaranteed to Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Debacle of Mortgage Finance. Princeton University Press.
• Akerlof and Shiller, 2009 , Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism. Princeton University Press.
• French et al., 2010, The Squam Lake Report: Fixing the Financial System. Princeton University Press.
• Garnaut and Llewellyn-Smith, 2009, The Great Crash of 2008. Melbourne University Publishing.
banking system. 8 This term refers to the event in which a money market fund can no longer sustain its policy of maintaining a $1.00-per-share net asset value of all of its client accounts because of significant market declines in the assets held by the fund. In other words, clients have lost part of their principal when their money market fund "breaks the buck" and its net asset value falls below $1.00.
• Gorton, 2010, Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007. Oxford University Press.
• Johnson and Kwak, 2010, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown. Pantheon Books.
• Rajan, 2010, Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy. Princeton University Press.
• • Farrell, 2010, Crash of the Titans: Greed, Hubris, the Fall of Merrill Lynch, and the Near-Collapse of Bank of America. Crown Business.
• Lewis, 2010, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine. Norton.
• Lowenstein, 2010, The End of Wall Street. Penguin Press.
• McLean and Nocera, 2010, All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis. Portfolio/Penguin.
• Morgenson and Rosner, 2011, Reckless Endangerment: How Outsized Ambition, Greed, and Corruption Led to Economic Armageddon. Times Books/Henry Holt and Co.
• Paulson, 2010, On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global Financial System. Business Plus.
• Refinancing a mortgage became impossible, and mortgage delinquency rates rose. Up to this point, this account parallels Shiller's basic bubble story. Here, however, Gorton claims the lack of common knowledge and the opaqueness of the structures of the mortgage-backed securities delayed the unraveling of the bubble. No one knew what was going to happen-or rather, many people thought they knew, but no single view dominated the market. As a device for aggregating information, the market was very slow to come up with an answer in this case.
When the answer came to the market, it came suddenly. Structured investment vehicles 9 The term "subprime" refers to the credit quality of the mortgage borrower as determined by various consumer credit-rating bureaus such as FICO, Equifax, and Experian. The highest-quality borrowers are referred to as "prime", hence the term "prime rate" refers to the interest rate charged on loans to such low-default-risk individuals. Accordingly, "subprime" borrowers have lower credit scores and are more likely to default than prime borrowers. Historically, this group was defined as borrowers with FICO scores below 640, although this has varied over time and circumstances, making it harder to determine what "subprime" really means.
and related conduits, which held a sixth of the AAA CDO tranches, 10 simply stopped rolling over their short-term debt. This wasn't due to overexposure in the subprime market: Gorton estimates that only two percent of structured investment vehicle holdings were subprime.
Rather, as Gorton states, "investors could not penetrate the portfolios far enough to make the determination. There was asymmetric information". At each step in the chain, one side knew significantly more than the other about the underlying structure of the securities involved. At the top layer of the cake, an investor might know absolutely nothing about the hundreds of thousands of mortgages several layers below the derivative being tradedand in normal situations, this does not matter. In a crisis, however, it clearly does. The rational investor will want to avoid risk; but as Gorton analogizes, the riskier mortgages in mortgage-backed securities had been intermingled like salmonella-tainted frosting among a very small batch of cakes that have been randomly mixed with all the other cakes in the factory and then shipped to bakeries throughout the country. 11 To continue Gorton's analogy, the collapse of the structured investment vehicle market, and the consequent stall in the repurchase (repo) market, represented the market recalling the contaminated cakes.
Here the story becomes more familiar to students of financial crises. Dislocation in the repo market was the first stage of a much broader liquidity crunch. 12 Short-term lending rates between banks rose dramatically, almost overnight, in August 2007, as banks became more uncertain about which of their counterparties might be holding the cakes with tainted frosting and possibily shut down by food inspectors, i.e., which banks might be insolvent because of declines in the market value of their assets. Fears of insolvency will naturally reduce interbank lending, and this so-called "run on repo" (Gorton's term) caused temporary disruptions in the price discovery system of short-term debt markets, an important source of funding for many financial institutions. In retrospect, the events in August 2007 were just a warm-up act for the main event that occurred in September 2008 when Lehman failed, triggering a much 10 The term "AAA" refers to the bond rating of the CDO, which is the highest-quality rating offered by the various rating agencies.
11 Gorton actually uses the analogy of E. coli-tainted beef in millions of pounds of perfectly good hamburger. I've exercised poetic license here by changing the reference to tainted frosting to maintain consistency with my layer-cake analogy, but I believe the thrust of his argument is preserved.
12 The term "repo" is short for "repurchase agreement", a form of short-term borrowing used by most banks, brokerage firms, money market funds, and other financial institutions. In a typical repo transaction, one party sells a security to another party, and agrees to buy it back at a later date for a slightly higher price. The seller (borrower) receives cash today for the security, which may be viewed as a loan, and the repurchase of the same security from the buyer (lender) at the later date may be viewed as the borrower repaying the lender the principal plus accrued interest. more severe run on repo in its aftermath. Gorton believes that the regulatory insistence of mark-to-market pricing, 13 even in a market with little to no liquidity, exacerbated the crisis. Certainly there was a substantial premium between mark-to-market values and those calculated by actuarial methods. These lowered asset prices then had a feedback effect on further financing, since the assets now had much less value as collateral, creating a vicious circle.
Gorton strongly disagrees with the "originate-to-distribute" explanation of the crisis.
This term, which became common in the summer of 2008, contrasts the previous behavior of financial institutions, which retained the loans and mortgages they approved, i.e., "originateto-hold", to the relatively new behavior of creating and packaging loans as products for further sale, i.e., "originate-to-distribute". The originate-to-distribute explanation places the blame on the misaligned incentives of the underwriters, who believed they had little exposure to risk; on the rating agencies, which didn't properly represent risk to investors;
and to a decline in lending standards, which allowed increasingly poor loans to be made.
Here Gorton becomes much less convincing, especially in light of later information, and he argues as if proponents of the originate-to-distribute explanation are directly attacking the general process of securitization itself (which may have been the case at the Jackson Hole conference). But there is little in Gorton's account-or for that matter, the recent historical record-to suggest that the originate-to-distribute explanation is excluded by the asymmetric information hypothesis. Simply because many lenders went under after the fact doesn't mean that their incentives were necessarily aligned correctly beforehand. However, there is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that a number of the most troubled financial institutions ran into difficulties in 2007-2008 precisely because they did not distribute all of the securitized debt they created, but kept a significant portion on their own balance sheets instead.
14 Perhaps with the benefit of more hindsight and data collection, we can get to the bottom of this debate in the near future.
13 "Mark-to-market pricing" is the practice of updating the value of a financial asset to reflect the most recent market transaction price. For illiquid assets that don't trade actively, marking such assets to market can be quite challenging, particularly if the only transactions that have occurred are "firesales" in which certain investors are desperate to rid themselves of such assets and sell them at substantial losses. This has the effect of causing all others who hold similar assets to recognize similar losses when they are forced to mark such assets to market, even if they have no intention of selling these assets.
14 These were presumably the "troubled assets" that the government's $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) were meant to relieve. 2003, attempts to rehabilitate John Maynard Keynes' concept of "animal spirits" into a broad interpretive framework for studying less quantitative economic phenomena, among them confidence, fairness, corruption, the money illusion, and stories, i.e., the power of narrative to shape events. Like Shiller's The Subprime Crisis, this is also meant for the advanced general reader, although earlier drafts were used in Shiller's course on behavioral economics at Yale. As a result, the book is variegated, but sometimes unfocused. While the insertion of material pertaining to the economic crisis isn't an afterthought, in some places, it feels like a ninety-degree turn away from the main thrust of their argument. These are serious allegations, and while there is no doubt that certain lenders did take advantage of certain borrowers, some empirical support would have been particularly welcome at this point, especially because the reverse also occurred. During the frothiest period of the housing market, stories abounded of homeowners flipping properties after a year or two, generating leveraged returns that would make a hedge-fund manager jealous. Moreover, loose lending standards also benefited first-time homebuyers who couldn't otherwise afford to purchase, and many of these households haven't defaulted and are presumably better off.
Moreover, even among the households who have defaulted, while many are certainly worse off, there are also those who can afford to pay their mortgage payments but have chosen to "strategically default" because it's simply more profitable to do so. Are we certain that predatory lending was more rampant than predatory borrowing, and that the cumulative benefits to all homeowners are less than the cumulative costs? I'm not advocating either side of this debate-in fact, it's difficult to formulate a sensible prior as to which is more likely-but I believe this is a sufficiently important issue to warrant gathering additional facts to support a particular conclusion.
In the end, Akerlof and Shiller believe, there was "an economic equilibrium that encompassed the whole chain", where no one had any incentive to rock the boat-until housing prices began to drop. As with Shiller's earlier book, their policy recommendations for the financial crisis appear almost naïvely optimistic with the passage of time. They suggest two stimulus targets. First, the proper fiscal and monetary stimulus needed to bring the American economy back to full employment. The proper target, they believed, would be easy to administer: "The Federal Reserve, the Congress, and the Council of Economic Advisers are all experienced in making such predictions". Second, they propose a target for the proper amount of credit needed to keep the economy at full employment. In retrospect, this-the more speculative of their proposals-is the one that has been most fully realized. In January The great size and central position of the American economy-the largest engine of growth in human history-didn't render it immune to basic forms of financial calamity. Nor, more disappointingly, did the expertise of its financial professionals or the strength of its financial institutions. Nor did the forces of globalization or innovation prevent the financial crisis-in fact, they may have provided it with new channels through which to propagate.
To respond to future crises, Reinhart and Rogoff suggest the further development of informational "early warning" systems and more detailed monitoring of national financial data, perhaps through a new international financial institution, similar to the development of standardized national account reporting after World War II. Their data appendices and analytics pave the way for such an initiative. They also warn about the recurrence of "this time is different" syndrome, something that observers since Charles Kindleberger (if not Charles Mackay) have warned against. Moreover, they preemptively dismiss future statements of "this time is different" based on the Lucas critique, Robert E. Lucas's famous macroeconomic dictum against historical prediction because simple linear extrapolations of the past don't take into account the sophistication of rational expectations. Reinhart and Rogoff argue that since the historical record shows that some nations have "graduated" from perennial financial instability to financial maturity, they believe there is reason to hope Australia's position as an English-speaking advanced economy, yet one still peripheral to the core global economies of the North, closely informs Garnaut and Llewellyn-Smith's account. Like Reinhart and Rogoff, they immediately tie the housing bubble to increased capital flows, especially those from China. They largely agree with the originate-to-distribute hypothesis, and they believe that regulatory capture and a culture of greed aided and abet-ted the development of the crisis. Where The Great Crash of 2008 is most valuable for an American reader, however, is through its descriptions of parallel innovations in the Australian financial industry and in Australian political economy. Here, the authors postulate a contagion of ideas through the English-speaking world-the "Anglosphere"-causing economies such as Australia, the United States, and Great Britain to experience similar consequences, e.g., securitization, the shadow banking system, housing price booms, and a rise in executive remuneration, rather than such developments arising naturally and independently in response to local economic conditions. It is a variation of the originate-to-distribute theory, made rhetorically sharper with the revelations of venality and outright criminality among intermediate links in the subprime chain. The largest misaligned incentives, however, in Stiglitz's view, were found among the "too big to fail" financial institutions, which Stiglitz argues took excessive risk because they were too big to fail; that is, they were so large and essential to the functioning of the financial systems of the American (and global) economy that their managers behaved as though they would be bailed out despite making poor decisions.
While such vitriol accurately channels a significant portion of the public's reaction to the crisis, there's not much new in the way of data or economic analysis. It seems eminently plausible that "too big to fail" and implicit government guarantees could affect corporate strategy to some extent, but quantifying the impact seems less obvious. In particular, to determine the effect that government bailouts might have on corporate risk-taking, it matters a great deal whether the bailouts are intended to rescue bondholders, equityholders, or both. This is where new economic analysis could have added real value. For example, given the empirical evidence in Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) and Murphy (2011) that CEOs' incentives seem highly aligned with shareholders, do implicit government guarantees cause shareholders to take on too much risk, in which case we need to focus on reducing the sizes of large financial institutions, as Johnson and Kwak (2010) propose (see below)? Or is this a reflection of deeper concerns regarding corporate governance and whether CEOs should be maximizing stakeholder wealth instead of shareholder wealth? Maximizing shareholder wealth is currently the focus of most U.S. CEOs and their executive compensation plans.
However, some of the rhetoric in this debate suggests an unspoken desire for more inclusive policies, which would be quite a departure from the corporate governance structures of most Anglo-Saxon and common-law countries such as the U.S. and U.K. This, they believe, would cause these problems to unwind, piece by piece, initially by decreasing the threat of "too big to fail" banks. As the financial sector becomes less "exciting" under these new rules, the incentives for pursuing risky behavior will diminish. Eventually, this virtuous cycle ends with changes to the institutional culture of the financial sector, returning to its earlier norms. Roubini and Mihm give a crisp exposition of the underlying mechanisms of the crisis.
In Roubini's view, the financial crisis wasn't a rare, unpredictable "black swan" event, but rather a wholly predictable and understandable "white swan". Comparing it to recent crises in developing economies and historical crises in developed ones, Roubini and Mihm present a short primer on contagion, government intervention, and lender of last resort theory, using them to set up the heart of the book: its policy prescriptions. They propose a two-tier approach of short-term patches and long-term fixes. Most of the short-term proposals have to do with reforms to the financial industry, including increased transparency, changes to compensation structure, and increased regulation and monitoring of the securitization process, the ratings agencies, and capital reserve requirements.
In contrast, Crisis Economics prescribes much stronger medicine for the long term. Bub- He proposes a three-pronged attack against the conditions that made the financial crisis 16 "Fannie Mae" is the nickname of the Federal National Mortgage Association, a government-sponsored enterprise created by Congress in 1938 to "support liquidity, stability, and affordability in the secondary mortgage market, where existing mortgage-related assets are purchased and sold". "Freddie Mac" refers to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, another government-sponsored enterprise created by Congress in 1970 with a charter virtually identical to Fannie Mae's. See http://www.fanniemae.com and http://ww.freddiemac.com for further details.
possible. First, he suggests a set of strong social policies to lower inequality in the United States, among them increasing educational access, universalizing health care, and decreasing the structural risks to personal labor mobility. Second, he recommends that international multilateral institutions develop relationships with the constituencies of their component nations, rather than functioning merely as a top-down council of ministers. More democratic input and greater transparency should, in Rajan's opinion, improve the quality of the decision-making process among the multilateral institutions on the one hand, and make their policy recommendations more palatable to their member nations on the other. This would allow greater international and domestic coordination regarding the global capital imbalance (and other pressing international issues).
Rajan proposes a complex set of carrots and sticks to defuse the bad incentives that have accumulated in the American financial sector. He believes risk was systematically underpriced in large part because of the financial sector's expectations of government intervention.
Removing the implicit promise of intervention and the explicit promise of subsidies would eliminate this distortion. The government should especially remove itself from the secondary mortgage market as soon as possible, and reduce its role in the primary mortgage market.
Even the role of deposit insurance, usually thought of as one of the centerpieces of American bank regulation, should be reconsidered according to him.
Meanwhile, financial corporate governance must reduce the amount of risk taken on by traders and companies. Instead of immediate compensation for investment strategies that might have hidden tail risk, Rajan proposes that a significant fraction of the bonuses generated by finance workers and management be held in escrow subject to later performance. This would have the effect of extending the time horizon used to calculate profit. If the traders and managers are acting rationally, this should, in theory, diminish tail risk.
17 At the highest levels, boards should choose prudent financial professionals who take an active role in their firms' operation.
Rajan believes the discipline of the market will not be enough, however. Other governmental regulation must simultaneously become more comprehensive and less sensitive to political over-or under-reaction. Many of the Squam Lake group's proposals will already be familiar to readers of this review. The group proposes that each nation set up a systemic financial regulatory agency run by the central bank. In terms of transparency, these regulators should collect much broader standardized data on financial institutions, and this data should become public after an interval. Capital requirements should increase with the size, risk, and liquidity of assets. Governments shouldn't impose limits on executive compensation, but they should impose rules that financial institutions withhold full compensation for a fixed time period.
Simply put, the government should be used to universalize regulation, but institutions should internalize the cost of their own failures.
Other proposals of the Squam Lake group are more novel. To maintain bank solvency, the group proposes that the government promote banks to issue a long-term convertible bond that converts to equity at very specific triggers during a crisis. In this way, instead of ad hoc government recapitalization during a banking crisis, the costs of recapitalization will be put on the bank's investors. To expedite a recovery, the group recommends that financial institutions maintain "living wills" to help regulators restructure them quickly in worst-case scenarios.
For problems specific to the recent crisis, however, the Squam Lake group offers fewer panaceas. The problem of systemic risk in credit default swaps (CDSs) is a difficult one, 18 but the Squam Lake Report can only suggest that the government encourage financial institutions to use a single, strongly regulated clearinghouse.
19 On other questions, such as the problem of runs on large brokers due to their unsegregated asset structure, the group cannot decide on a solution based on existing research. Interestingly, the group attempts to walk through how specific failures during the financial crisis, such as the collapse of Bear Stearns, would have played out had their recommendations been in place. Candidly enough, they see a modest improvement at the firm level, and a reduced cost to the taxpayer, but they make no claims that the financial crisis itself would have been averted. 18 A "credit default swap" is an agreement between two parties in which one party agrees to pay the other party a pre-specified amount of money in the event of a default on a third party's bond. Essentially a type of insurance contract, CDSs were used to provide credit protection for various mortgage-backed securities like collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which was particularly popular among the most conservative investors in CDOs such as money market funds.
19 A "clearinghouse" is a legal entity that serves as an intermediary between two counterparties so that if either one defaults on its obligation, the clearinghouse will fulfill that obligation. The presence of a clearinghouse greatly reduces "counterparty risk" and enhances the liquidity of the contracts traded, which is especially relevant for credit default swaps. The other half of this trillion-dollar problem, the authors agree, is to never let a similar situation arise again. The authors believe that the problem is inherent to governmentsponsored enterprises with laudable social goals, especially in the housing market, and they point to similar but smaller failures in Germany and Spain. They reject full nationalization due to its enormous liability-Johnson had partially privatized Fannie Mae for much lessand for the likely political capture of its management. In a similar spirit, they are agnostic about full privatization, foreseeing that the largest private mortgage originators would simply induce enough regulatory capture to become government-sponsored enterprises in all but name. The authors attempt to split the difference by proposing a private-public partnership for the mortgage guarantee business only, the lower levels of the mortgage industry becoming fully private (although highly regulated). Finally, the authors believe the root cause of the mortgage finance debacle, and by extension, the entire global financial crisis from 2007-the American "addiction" to homeownership-should be treated posthaste.
Journalistic Accounts
While often overlooked by academic readers, the journalistic accounts of the financial crisis are complementary in many ways to their academic counterparts. If we return to the analogy of the financial crisis as a major war, then in the same way that the academic writers acted as the strategists, diplomats, and gadflies of the crisis, the financial reporters were the war correspondents. These journalists documented the campaigns, battles, and the exceptional acts of courage and cowardice among individuals and battalions. Moreover, they describe elements of the crisis that, as a scientific discipline, economics has difficulty capturing: the role of motives, psychology, personality, and strong emotion. We have seen how George Akerlof, Robert Shiller, Joseph Stiglitz, Nouriel Roubini, and others have touched upon the role of greed, fear, and anger in the housing bubble, the financial crisis, and its policy responses. By breaking down the macro-events of the crisis into many different personal stories, these accounts are actually literary attempts to make sense of the crisis from a microfoundational level. It's difficult to speak of rational behavior in the aggregate when major former finance professional turned investigative reporter, documents the harrowing final days of the firm, and this morbidly fascinating tale reminds us that economics has few answers to liquidity crises, thin markets, and other situations where the price discovery mechanism fails to perform. As the financial analyst A. Gary Shilling put it, "Markets can remain irrational a lot longer than you and I can remain solvent". In those circumstances, economic actors will necessarily fall back onto procedures which, almost by definition, will produce suboptimal outcomes, e.g., the fate of Bear Stearns. Cohan is also very strong in his portrayal of economic decision-making under stress and decision-making by small groups, two areas which have recently begun to receive more scholarly attention.
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Bear Stearns was the first of the major American banking firms to fall during the financial crisis, and it's commonly believed that it was also the weakest in terms of oversight, incorrectly aligned incentives, and organizational culture to handle the crisis. While this might In a heady intellectual atmosphere of Friedrich von Hayek and Eugene Fama, this young team sought to create a successful derivative product that would protect against default risk, something all lending institutions have to deal with. This product would combine the virtuous motive of helping to expand capital into the greater economy with the self-interested motive of helping to expand Morgan's share of the derivatives market. Banks for the first time would be able to make loans without carrying the associated credit risks of those loans, which would be transferred to the buyers of the derivative.
At the cutting edge of financial engineering for its time, these new derivatives were "technically sweet", to borrow J. Robert Oppenheimer's postwar description of the atomic bomb. As a product, their design principles were similar to other consumer success stories: they were easy for the investor to buy and sell; they could use a wide variety of starting materials in their bundled loans through the securitization process; and they conformed to (or, more strictly speaking, evaded) government and industry standards. Morgan's first BISTROs-broad index secured trust offerings-were issued in December 1997, and the product quickly became a hot item. later publication date, however, allows him to explore the continuation of economic policy in the new Obama administration, the beginnings of the new low-lending, high-unemployment era that followed, and the early political conflicts over governmental economic stimulus.
Lowenstein views the financial crisis as a failure of the market system and postindustrial capitalism, a sentiment that manages to sound surprisingly conventional in his hands-a measure, perhaps, of the depths of the crisis. Intriguingly, he considers the crisis a natural consequence of a financial system that, rather than extracting Marxist super-profits from society, extracted risk from its investments and dumped it on those members of society least able to handle it. The individual firm reduces its risk, but society as a whole has its risk increased. There are several economics and finance Ph.D. theses that need to be written to sort out this one idea.
In November 
Fact and Fantasy
There are several observations to be made from the number and variety of narratives that the authors in this review have proffered. The most obvious is that there is still significant disagreement as to what the underlying causes of the crisis were, and even less agreement as to what to do about it. But what may be more disconcerting for most economists is the fact that we can't even agree on all the facts. Did CEOs take too much risk, or were they acting as they were incentivized to act? Was there too much leverage in the system? Did regulators do their jobs or was forbearance a significant factor? Was the Fed's low interest-rate policy responsible for the housing bubble, or did other factors cause housing prices to skyrocket?
Was liquidity the issue with respect to the run on the repo market, or was it more of a solvency issue among a handful of "problem" banks?
For financial economists-who are used to dealing with precise concepts such as noarbitrage conditions, portfolio optimization, linear risk/reward trade-offs, and dynamic hedging strategies-this is a terribly frustrating state of affairs. Many of us like to think of financial economics as a science, but complex events like the financial crisis suggest that this conceit may be more wishful thinking than reality. John Maynard Keynes had even greater ambitions for economics when he wrote, "If economists could manage to get themselves thought of as humble, competent people on a level with dentists, that would be splendid".
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Instead, we're now more likely to be thought of as astrologers, making pronouncements and predictions without any basis in fact or empirical evidence.
To make this contrast more stark, compare the authoritative and conclusive accident reports of the National Transportation Safety Board-which investigates and documents the who-what-when-where-and-why of every single plane crash-with the 21 separate and sometimes inconsistent accounts of the financial crisis we've just reviewed (and more books are surely forthcoming). Why is there such a difference? The answer is simple: complexity and human behavior.
While airplanes often crash because of human behavior or "pilot error", the causes of such 22 Keynes (1932, Part V) .
accidents can usually be accurately and definitively determined with sufficient investigatory resources. Typically there are a small number of human actors involved-the pilots, an air traffic controller, and perhaps some maintenance crew. Also, the nature of accidents in this domain is fairly tightly constrained: an airplane loses aerodynamic lift and falls to the ground.
While there may be many underlying reasons for such an outcome, investigators often have a pretty clear idea of where to look. In other words, we have sufficiently precise models for how airplanes fly that we can almost always determine the specific causal factors for their failure through relatively linear chains of physical investigation and logical deduction.
Human behavior is just one part of that chain, and thanks to flight data recorders and the relatively narrow set of operations that piloting an aircraft involves-for example, the pilot must lower the landing gear before the plane can land, and there's only one way to lower it-the complexity of the human/machine interface isn't beyond the collective intellectual horsepower of the NTSB's teams of expert investigators. Now compare this highly structured context with piloting an investment bank, where the "instrument panel" is the steady stream of news reports, market data, internal memos, emails, text messages, and vague impressions that a CEO is bombarded with almost 24/7, not all of which is true; where the "flight controls" are often human subordinates, not mechanical devices or electronic switches; and where there is no single "flight data recorder", but rather hundreds of distinct narratives from various stakeholders with different motivations and intentions, generating both fact and fantasy. If we want to determine whether or not the failure of Lehman Brothers was due to "pilot error", like the NTSB, we need to reconstruct the exact state of Lehman prior to the accident, deduce the state of mind of all the executives involved at the time, determine which errors of commission and omission they made, and rule out all but one of the many possible explanations of the realized course of events.
Given that we can't even agree on a set of facts surrounding the financial crisis, nor do we fully understand what the "correct" operation of a financial institution ought to be in every circumstance, the challenges facing economists are far greater than those faced by the NTSB. However, the stakes are also far higher, as we've witnessed over the past four years. There is a great deal to be learned from the NTSB's methods and enviable track record, as Fielding, Lo, and Yang (2011) illustrate in their case study of this remarkable organization. And one of the most basic elements of their success is starting with a single set of incontrovertible facts. In other words, we need the equivalent of the "black box" flight data recorder for the financial industry, otherwise we may never get to the bottom of any serious financial accident.
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An instructive example of the importance of getting the facts straight is the role that financial leverage played in the crisis, which is described in Lo and Mueller (2010, pp. 50-51 In loosening the capital rules, which are supposed to provide a buffer in turbulent times, the agency also decided to rely on the firms' own computer models for determining the riskiness of investments, essentially outsourcing the job of monitoring risk to the banks themselves.
Over the following months and years, each of the firms would take advantage of the looser rules. At Bear Stearns, the leverage ratio-a measurement of how much the firm was borrowing compared to its total assets-rose sharply, to 33 to 1. In other words, for every dollar in equity, it had $33 of debt. The ratios at the other firms also rose significantly.
The reports of sudden increases in leverage from 12-to-1 to 33-to-1 seemed to be the "smoking gun" that many had been searching for in their attempts to determine the causes of the Fi- • Former SEC chief economist Susan Woodward cited this "fact" in a presentation to the Allied Social Sciences Association Annual Meeting (the largest annual gathering of economists) on January 3, 2009 (Woodward, 2009 ).
• On December 5, 2008, Columbia University Law Professor John Coffee (2008) wrote in the New York Law Journal that after the rule change,"The result was predictable: all five of these major investment banks increased their debt-to-equity leverage ratios significantly in the period following their entry into the CSE program".
• In a January 2009 Vanity Fair article, Nobel-prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz (2009) listed five key "mistakes" that led to the financial crisis and "One was the decision in April 2004 by the Securities and Exchange Commission, at a meeting attended by virtually no one and largely overlooked at the time, to allow big investment banks to increase their debt-to-capital ratio (from 12:1 to 30:1, or higher) so that they could buy more mortgage-backed securities, inflating the housing bubble in the process". He repeats this claim in Freefall (p. 163): "Then, in a controversial decision in April 2004, [the SEC] seems to have given them even more latitude, as some investment banks increased their leverage to 40 to 1".
• On January 24, 2009, Alan Blinder, a professor of economics at Princeton University and a former vice-chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, published a piece in the "Economic View" column of The New York Times titled "Six Errors on the Path to the Financial Crisis" in which this rule change was Error Number 2 on his list (Blinder, 2009 ).
• Even in Reinhart and Rogoff's (2009, pp. 213-214) otherwise meticulously researched book, they write "What could in retrospect be recognized as huge regulatory mistakes, including the deregulation of the subprime mortgage market and the 2004 decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission to allow investment banks to triple their leverage ratios (that is, the ratio measuring the amount of risk to capital), appeared benign at the time".
If such sophisticated and informed individuals can be misled on a relatively simple and empirically verifiable issue, what does that imply about less-informed stakeholders in the financial system? Lo and Mueller (2010) conjecture that these misinterpretations of Rule 15c3-1 were generated and perpetuated by the apparent cognitive consistency between the extraordinary losses of Bear, Lehman, and Merrill and a superficial reading of the 2004 SEC rule changeafter all, it seems perfectly plausible that a loosening of net capital rules in 2004 could have caused broker-dealers to increase their leverage. Only the most neurotic of academics would dig further to attempt to refute a "fact" that jibes with his or her intuition and preconceptions. When new information confirms our priors, we usually don't ask why. This example should serve as a cautionary tale for all of us, and underscores the critical need to collect, check, and accumulate data from which more accurate inferences can then be drawn.
Without the immutable hard platform of objective facts on which we can build an accurate narrative of the crisis that stands the test of time, there's little hope for scientific progress as the waves of public opinion toss our perspective in one direction or another. This is one of the most compelling reasons to read more than one account of the financial crisis, and to seek out those books that may not agree with our preconceptions, just in case we've been inadvertently misled through faulty "facts".
Readers will find the 21 books reviewed in this article to be useful-but not unbiased or flawless-inputs to their own critical thinking about the crisis. Given the complexity of the events surrounding this debacle, the best hope for arriving at a deeper understanding of financial crises and how to respond to them is through the collective intelligence of all economists, each of us laboring to develop our own interpretation that can inform and improve the consensus. Like the characters in Rashomon, we may never settle on a single narrative that explains all the facts; such a "super-narrative" may not even exist. But by working with a common set of facts, we have a much better chance of responding more effectively and preparing more successfully for future crises. 
